Th is paper examines the amount of slack in the UK labor market. It examines the downward adjustments made by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to both unemployment and underemployment, which in our view are invalid. Without any evidence the MPC in its assessment of the output gap reduces the level of unemployment because of its claim that long-term unemployment has no eff ect on wages. We produce contrary evidence. Th e MPC further reduces the level of underemployment in the United Kingdom by half. We present arguments as to why we also think this inappropriate. We set out arguments on why we believe the level of slack is greater than the MPC calibrates. Consistent with that is the fact that real wages in the United Kingdom continue to fall.
INTRODUCTION
Th e extent of labor market slack in the UK economy is an ongoing question given the recent unexpectedly rapid fall in the unemployment rate. In the latest data release for February-April, which is referred to as March 2014, it was 6.6 percent, down from 7.9 percent in May 2010 and 7.8 percent in March 2013.
However, other measures of labor market slack suggest that the UK economy is still a long way from its full employment level. First, the number of workers in temporary jobs who could not fi nd permanent jobs is up from 565,000 in May 2010 to 601,000 in April 2014. Second, the proportion of workers who are self-employed is up from 12.9 percent in September 2008 to 14.9 percent now. Th is is a concern given we know that these jobs on average tend to be low paid, and there is no evidence that a higher self-employment rate is correlated with better macroeconomic outcomes (Blanchfl ower 2004) . Th ird, the number of parttime workers who would like to be full-time is up from a low of 670,000 in April 2008, and up further from 1,072,000 when the coalition was formed, in May 2010, to 1,400,000 in the most recent Offi ce for National Statistics (ONS) Labour Market Statistics, June 2014. Long-term unemployment, as measured by those who have been continuously unemployed for at least a year, is up from 381,000 and just under 800,000 both in May 2010 and at the time of writing. Th e big question is, how far is the UK economy from full employment, when it would be expected that nominal wage increases would start to rise sharply?
Finally nominal wage growth remains benign and if anything appears to be slowing once more. In the latest ONS data release for June 2014, the rolling three-month average for February-April 2014 showed annual wage growth of the national statistic average weekly earnings (AWE) of 0.7 percent and 0.6 percent in the private sector. Th is number was artifi cially low because of deferred bonuses in April 2013, which markedly raised the base, but there is little sign that nominal wage growth is about to pick up. Indeed the last six months of data show very little change at all.
1 Moreover, the survey from which the AWE is calculated, the Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey (MWSS), excludes all workers in fi rms with fewer than 20 employees as well as the self-employed, whose earnings are likely to have seen little or no growth over the last year or so. Consumer price index (CPI) infl ation is currently at 1.8 percent, below the Monetary Policy Committee's (MPC's) 2 percent target, and the retail prices index (RPI) is at 2.5 percent, both of which generate negative real wage growth. Figure 1 plots the average weekly earnings (AWE) defl ated by the RPI, which is the most commonly used measure of the cost-of-living for pay-setting purposes. RPI defl ated real wages have risen only once in the last 71 months, in April 2013, when impending changes such an optimistic view. To date, during the start of the recovery, the productivity performance of the economy has been weak and it has not created room for wage rises, even though it has been good news for employment and unemployment. Moreover, because unemployment has not risen by as much as in previous recessions, when and if it falls, there is less scope than in the past for it to boost wage growth through the usual wage curve mechanisms (that is, the reverse of the wage-depressing eff ects of unemployment in Blanchfl ower and Oswald 1994a, 1994b) . Another factor, which predates the recession, is that the wages of typical UK workers are no longer keeping up with productivity gains made in the economy because increased gross wage inequality leads to average earnings rising faster than median earnings.
Th e main drivers of wage pressure come from an intricate blend of "insider" and "outsider" forcespeople who would like to work and are currently in or out of a job. Th ere is evidence that unemployment has started to fall (although it rose in the most recent ONS release), so outsider pressures pushing down on pay may have weakened a little. But it is quite clear that the economy is still well below full employment and there is a large amount of slack in the labor market. Th ere is little or evidence of widespread skill shortages, which would push up wages; and public-sector pay freezes with continuing redundancies push down on workers' bargaining power in the one part of the economy where there is still a high level of union coverage. Firms have started to grow, so their ability to raise pay levels may have increased slightly, but so far we see no evidence of any change in their willingness to pay. Blanchfl ower and Machin (2014) suggest this does raise a key question, why, if nothing changes, wouldn't fi rm owners continue to keep any gains to 4 themselves? It stretches credulity to believe that in the absence of signifi cant skill shortages bosses will off er pay increases to their workers when they have shown no inclination to do so for several years.
Paul Gregg, Stephen Machin, and Mariña Fernández-Salgado (2014a, R15) , 2 concur that there is little likelihood of rising real wage growth:
For a sustained wage recovery the economy also needs to generate a return to the levels of productivity growth normally seen, but which have been notably absent over the past six years. As labor becomes scarce and more expensive we should expect fi rms to increase investment, generating productivity improvements. But even this will not be enough for sustained real wage gains to come about unless the distribution of the returns from productivity growth can be channeled back to ordinary workers. Th is was the historical norm, but it stopped in the early 2000s-importantly before the downturn-with a disproportionate share of productivity gains going to support pension commitments and rapidly rising salaries of very highly paid workers.
Indeed, in a recent speech in Australia, economics Nobel laureate Jim Mirrlees concurred that there is unlikely to be any signifi cant wage growth in the United Kingdom any time soon. Mirrlees argued that one of the implications of the move to economic equilibrium is that owners of capital will get more and workers will get less. "Certainly, if you are looking at this from the point of view of countries like Australia, the United States, Hong Kong, and Britain then that seems to be the way of it. … Of course, if it is right that wages will get equalized that would mean that wages in China and India will be higher. But it looks to me that they would be much lower in Australia, Britain, and the United States than people are hoping."
Our concern here is to examine two components of slack in the United Kingdom. Th e fi rst is long-term unemployment and the second is underemployment. Without adequate explanation, in our view, the MPC, by a swish of its collective pen, is reducing some of its eff ect so that the level of slack in the UK economy appears smaller than it should be. Th is seems highly questionable. In each case the MPC has explained these adjustments in a box in its May 2014 Infl ation Report called "Assessing the Degree of Spare
Capacity."
LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT
Th e MPC assesses currently that the amount of slack in the economy is "probably in the region of 1-1.5 percent." 3 Th e vast majority of this spare capacity, it argues, is not inside fi rms but within the labor market.
Its estimate of the medium-term equilibrium unemployment rate refl ects changes in the number of people out of work for more than six months: Th e longer that someone has been out of work, the lower the proba-2. See also the revised report : Gregg, Machin, and Fernández-Salgado (2014b In particular, the MPC argues, the equilibrium rate tends to decline when unemployment is falling.
Changes in the equilibrium rate are then calculated by weighting together changes in 6-12 month, and more than 12-month, unemployment rates. downward trend seen over the previous four decades, it notes that average hours have risen over the past fi ve years. Th at was accompanied by rises in a measure of the hours that those in employment would, on average, like to work as we have noted in several papers (Bell and Blanchfl ower 2011 , 2013a , 2013b . And the proportion of part-time employees reporting that they would prefer a full-time job-an indicator of the gap between actual and medium-term equilibrium average hours-the MPC rightly notes, has been elevated in recent years. It goes on to argue that "it is, however, impossible to determine how much of the rise in desired hours is a response to the eff ects of the crisis-such as lower household real income-that is likely to reverse in time, and how much is likely to persist." Moreover, Labour Force Survey (LFS) data show that, in the past, people who reported working fewer hours than desired subsequently seemed satisfi ed with smaller increases than they said they wanted. Th e MPC argues that its "estimate of medium-term equilibrium average hours is consistent with the judgment that only around half of the present gap between actual hours and the estimate of desired hours represents labor market slack." Th is judgment seems to be based on a few calculations presented in a recent speech by Martin Weale (2014) based on a longitudinal sample of a few hundred underemployed and overemployed workers observed between 2012 and 2013.
To illustrate the extent of the entirely made-up adjustments-so-called "judgments"-the MPC is making, if we take the most recent data available for 2013Q4, we have an unemployment rate of 7.2 percent and an underemployment rate of an additional 1.8 percent, making an underemployment rate of 9 percent. Th e MPC's fi rst adjustment takes half of that away, i.e., 0.9 percent from underemployment.
Based on the fact that there were 2,341,511 unemployed, of whom 845,369 had been continuously unemployed for at least a year, or 36.1 percent of the total, the MPC then in its second adjustment reduces the unemployment rate by half of that, i.e., 18 percent, which means it lowers the unemployment rate-by guessing-by 1.3 percent. So the underemployment rate according to the MPC is really 6.8 percent and the unemployment rate 5.9 percent, hence its forecasts for rising real wage growth despite the fact there is absolutely no sign whatsoever of any. We object to both of these adjustments on the grounds that they are not based on robust evidence. We believe that the scale of slack in the UK economy is consequently greater than the 1 to 1.5 percent of GDP than the MPC asserts. Plus we now present new evidence to support our arguments that the scale of slack in the UK economy is much greater. Figure 2 plots the unemployment rate and the proportion of the unemployed with duration of at least a year. It is observed that as unemployment rises long-term unemployment rises, and as unemployment falls the proportion of the unemployed with long durations also falls. High long-term unemployment is highly correlated with high unemployment so long-term unemployment doesn't seem that diff erent from short-term unemployment. Th at is confi rmed in fi gure 3 where four unemployment rates are plotted:
EVIDENCE ON LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT AND ITS IMPACT
7 fewer than 6 months; 6 but under 12 months; 12 but under 24 months; and 24 months and over. Each of the four series is expressed as a rate, and collectively they sum to the overall unemployment rate. So, if the unemployment rate was 10 percent with equal amounts in each category, then each would be plotted as 2.5 percent. As noted above, all four rates move closely together, suggesting there is nothing special about the long-term unemployment rate.
Background table 1 reports the incidence of long-term unemployment over time and across major OECD countries from 1988 to 2012. Th e incidence in the United Kingdom is lower than it was at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, whereas the United States has seen a marked rise in the incidence of long-term unemployment in the recent recession. Long-term unemployment rates are especially high in the euro area countries that have high unemployment rates and especially so in Greece, Ireland, and
Italy. Interestingly the percent of the unemployed with long durations was higher in Germany than in the United Kingdom. Figure 4 plots the proportions of the unemployed with long durations in Canada,
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States and confi rms the recent uptick in the United States, along with a recent sharp fall, to more typically European levels.
Of interest is the fact that the number of long-term unemployed in the United Kingdom has been falling as the unemployment rate has fallen. Th e number of those continuously unemployed for more than a year has fallen from 915,000 in April 2013 to 791,000 in March 2014, or just over one-third of the total fall in unemployment over the same period. In the United States there is a similar story; over the last 12 months from May 2013 to May 2014 unemployment fell by 1,891,000 while those unemployed for 27 weeks or more fell by 979,000 or around a half.
In a recent paper that has gained a lot of attention, Alan B. Krueger, Judd Cramer, and David Cho (2014) examined whether the long-term unemployed in the United States were on the margins of the labor market. Th ey fi nd that the long-term unemployed have about a 1 in 10 chance of moving into employment in any given month and also tend to withdraw from the labor force at higher rates than the short-term unemployed, although they do note that labor force withdrawal rates collapse in a recession. Th ey warn that while "some may wish to draw macroeconomic policy implications from our fi ndings, only time will tell if infl ation and real wage growth are more dependent on the short-term unemployment rate than total unemployment rate." Th ey do not examine whether indeed that was the case, but we do that here.
A new paper by Glenn D. Rudebusch and John C. Williams (2014) Because there are so few degrees of freedom, neither study can distinguish between the impact of high unemployment and high long-term unemployment, which are strongly correlated. Our analysis below concludes that aggregate time series analyses tells us absolutely nothing, as in zero, about the impact of long-term unemployment on wages or prices.
We should note that this issue isn't new, since there was a major debate on this in the 1980s and 1990s. At the time, Europe had high long-term unemployment while the United States did not.
Richard Layard and Stephen Nickell (1987) , for example, argue that the long-term unemployed imposed much less wage pressure than the short-term unemployed. In a series of annual time series regressions they found evidence that a long-term unemployment term, defi ned as the number of those who had been unemployed expressed as a proportion of total unemployment, entered positively in a wage equation.
David Blanchfl ower and Andrew Oswald (1990) show using microdata for the United Kingdom that this was not the case and long-term unemployment did not play any independent role in wage determination.
Th e problem was that high long-term unemployment was highly correlated with high unemployment.
Th ey conclude that "the British evidence does not support the view that long-term unemployment is an important element in the wage determination process."
Blanchfl ower and Adam Posen (2014) examine the impact of long-term unemployment in a series of hourly and weekly wage equations using data from the Current Population Survey pooled across state and year cells, for the period 1990-2013. Th e authors include year and state fi xed eff ects, a lagged dependent variable, and the log of unemployment and inactivity rates, which both entered signifi cantly negative.
Th ey also include separate variables for the proportion of the unemployed with durations of 15-plus weeks;
27-plus weeks; and one year and over. No evidence was found that the long-term unemployed had a smaller wage reducing eff ect than the short-term unemployed, confi rming the earlier work in Blanchfl ower and Oswald (1990). If anything, even evidence was found to suggest long-term unemployment lowers wage growth even more than short-term unemployment.
Similar evidence indicating that long-term unemployment and short-term unemployment have equivalent eff ects on infl ation in the United States has been found using data on prices rather than wages.
In a recent paper, Michael T. Kiley (2014) considers this question using cross-section time series data on 24 large metropolitan areas. Th is approach has the benefi t of controlling for both time and area fi xed eff ects that the time series studies mentioned above (which suff er from aggregation and missing variable biases, 9 and few degrees of freedom) cannot. Th e dependent variable is the CPI in each metropolitan area by year.
Rather than including a variable for the long-term unemployment proportion, Kiley includes short-and long-term unemployment rates, which are functionally similar.
It is notable that Kiley fi nds that the coeffi cients in his price change equations on local unemployment rates are similar and precisely estimated; hence, the data do not reject the hypothesis that short-and long-term unemployment rates have identical eff ects on infl ation. Kiley is thus able to conclude that "the results suggest that long-term unemployment has exerted similar downward pressure on infl ation to that exerted by short-term unemployment in recent decades." Th is fi nding is consistent with
Blanchfl ower and Posen's fi ndings using data on wages across US states.
In we include the log of the regional unemployment rate plus a long-term unemployment variable, defi ned as the proportion of the unemployed that have been continuously unemployed for at least a year, which has a mean of 31.1 percent. If the long-term unemployed exert less pressure on wages than the short-term unemployed, this variable should be signifi cant and positive-but it never is. We calculate these variables from the LFS data. In column 1 we include these variables along with a set of year dummies, and for both hourly and weekly wages neither the unemployment rate nor the long-term unemployment rate is signifi cant. Column 2 adds region dummies, and the log unemployment rate is now signifi cant and negative for both hourly and weekly wages.
Th e wage unemployment elasticity of pay-the wage curve-is calculated as −.09 for hourly wages and −.06 for weekly. Th is is done by setting the coeffi cient on W t-1 equal to W t and solving for the long-run elasticity. In column 3, personal controls are added and the results are largely unchanged. Th e wage unemployment elasticity of pay-the wage curve-is calculated as −.05 for both hourly and weekly wages. Consistent with Blanchfl ower and Oswald's (1990) claim, we also fi nd that the UK evidence does not support the view that long-term unemployment is an important element in the wage determination process. We fi nd no evidence that the long-term unemployed have any diff erent impact on wages than the short-term unemployed. Hence, we conclude that it is singularly inappropriate for the MPC to reduce the level of slack due to the number of long-term unemployed. Th e MPC has produced no evidence for the United Kingdom to sustain its view that an adjustment should be made, and based on the new evidence presented here we draw exactly the opposite conclusion: No downward adjustment should be made.
EVIDENCE ON UNDEREMPLOYMENT AND ITS IMPACT
In a series of recent papers we have examined the extent of underemployment in the UK economy (Bell and Blanchfl ower 2011 , 2013a , 2013b based on data from the Labour Force Surveys from 2001Q2 through 2014Q4. 6 Workers are asked if they would "like to work longer hours, at current basic rate of pay, given the opportunity?" If they respond in the affi rmative they are asked for the number of hours they would like to work. A similar set of questions is asked for those who would like shorter hours. Th e responses for each series through 2014Q1 are plotted in fi gure 5, which shows that until 2008 the two series were essentially equal to each other. With the onset of recession there was a slight drop in the "fewer hours" series and a big jump in the "more hours" series. Figure 6 plots the seasonally adjusted underemployment rate and the unemployment rate. In 2014Q1 the underemployment rate was 8.4 percent and the unemployment rate 6.8 percent; both have dropped from their peaks in 2011Q4.
7 Th e MPC in its infl ation reports also states the underemployment rate using our methods, although it expresses it as the number of hours the currently employed on average would like to work, which of course is equivalent. In Averaged across all workers underemployment amounts to approximately an additional half an hour per worker. Given there are 32.7 million workers in the United Kingdom working an average of 32.1 hours, this would amount to approximately half a million additional workers, which is a lot of additional slack. 7. For details on how the underemployment rate is calculated see Bell and Blanchfl ower (2011 , 2013a , 2013b .
8. In the United States there has been little movement in underutilization rates. Th e broad measure of underutilization, U-6, has moved very closely with the unemployment rate. What has moved is the inactivity rate, which has fallen, which it has not done in the United Kingdom. For example in the United States in 2008Q1 the inactivity rate for 16 to 64 year olds was 25 percent compared with 27 percent in 2013Q4, whereas in the United Kingdom the inactivity rate fell between these two dates from 24 percent to 23 percent. Blanchfl ower and Posen (2014) show that the inactivity rate along with the unemployment rate pushes down on wages. See also Erceg and Levin (2014) .
In table 4 we attempt to determine who the underemployed are using microdata from the LFS from 2001Q1 through 2014Q1. In total there are 2.8 million observations. We set the dependent variable to zero if the worker responds that he or she doesn't want to change the hours; if he or she wants longer hours, then the number of hours wanted is included as a positive number. If the worker says he or she wants fewer hours then that number is included as a negative number. Th e mean of the variable is negative from 2001-08 and positive after that. 9 We include controls for region of residence; year dummies and controls for type of public sector organization and schooling (not reported); age, gender, race; whether the respondent was an A8 or A2 migrant; and whether he or she was a full-time worker. Separate estimates are provided for the whole time period and for the recession years of 2012Q1 to 2014Q1. Th e third and fourth columns are restricted to employees only, adding years of tenure and its square and whether the job was permanent. In the fi nal column the log of hourly pay is included as a control, which reduces the sample size since earnings data are provided only in the fi rst and fi fth of the fi ve sample waves.
Th e main fi ndings are that the young and the least educated and minorities, who have the highest unemployment rates, are especially likely to say they would like more hours. 10 Similarly migrants from the A8 and the A2 accession countries are also especially likely to desire more hours, as are racial minorities.
Th e self-employed also want more hours as do those with temporary or part-time jobs. In the fi nal column, and ignoring issues of endogeneity, it is apparent that low-wage workers want more hours.
In a recent speech Weale (2014) argued that
It is obviously tempting to look at these fi gures and regard the gap between actual hours and desired hours as a simple additional source of labor market slack. On that basis it might seem that hours worked could rise by around 1½ percent, simply as a result of people fi nding as much work to do as they would like to do. Th ere are, however, grounds for caution, even before those fi gures are translated into eff ective labor supply. … It may be the case that some of the net underemployment is a response to the state of the economy rather than any indication of genuine extra capacity. For example people whose partners lose their jobs may well say that they would like to work longer. But once their partners fi nd new jobs, they may lose interest in doing so.
Or they may not. To be clear there are no other papers that imply that our underemployment index 11 overstates how much underemployment there is in the United Kingdom. We now turn to an analysis conducted by Weale (2014) where he examined underemployment using LFS data based on a longitudinal sample of individuals observed in the fi rst wave in 2012 and for the fi fth time in 2013 that reduces the amount of net underemployment by two-thirds. His fi ndings are reported in table 5, along with the sample sizes in parentheses. Weale fi nds that those who said they were underemployed said they wanted an average of 11.7 extra hours per week. Th ose who were underemployed in the fi rst wave but fully employed in the fi fth wave increased their hours by 6.5 hours per week. Th ose who were underemployed in the fi rst wave and were fully employed in the second desired a reduction of 11.3 hours per week but actually achieved a reduction of 4 hours. Weale then takes these data to adjust the number of potential underemployed hours downward in a highly arbitrary way as follows:  Weale calculates a "productivity adjustment" for the underemployed and the overemployed using the ratio of the wage of those who were underemployed in the fi rst wave and fully employed in the second (£9.49 per hour) compared with the wage of those who were fully employed at both sweeps (£13.94 per hour), i.e., 9.49/13.94 = 0.68. So 719,595 * 0.68 = 489,324 worker equivalents higher.
 Th e productivity adjustment is repeated for the overemployed using the ratio of the wage of those who were overemployed in the fi rst wave and fully employed in the second (£16.  We did not use wages in deriving our measure precisely because our intention was to derive a measure of labor market slack that was not itself a function of wages. To include wages in a measure of labor market slack, which in turn is to be used to capture aggregate wage pressure, invites criticisms of endogeneity bias.
Th ere are numerous problems with this analysis: were unemployed while 1,305 were fully employed. In the case of the 2,105 underemployed: 14 were inactive in 2012; 29 were unemployed, while 1,401 were fully employed.
14  Weale's comparison of desired hours with subsequently realized hours requires that the individual is present in wave 1 and wave 5 of the Labour Force Survey. Th e young, who typically want to work more hours, are less likely to respond in wave 5, conditional on having responded in wave 1, whereas the old, who typically want to work fewer hours, are more likely to respond on both occasions. Weale calculates changes in hours of work for employees who previously wanted to work more hours or fewer hours and who describe themselves as fully employed in wave 5. He fi nds that those who want to reduce their hours are less successful in doing so than those who want to increase their hours.
According to Weale, in assessing labor market slack, one should discount the reduction in hours sought by the overemployed more heavily than the increase in hours sought by the underemployed. Th is suggests that our measure of underemployment underestimates its true extent, since we treat claims for more or fewer hours by the underemployed or overemployed as equally valid.
 His claim that our measure of underemployment exaggerates the extent of labor market slack is based on another calculation, which relates to productivity. He suggests that because the underemployed who remain underemployed earn less than those who become fully employed, the additional hours that the underemployed desire should be discounted by 32 percent, while the reduction in hours sought by the overemployed should be increased by 16 percent. Th ese adjustments would result in a substantial reduction in our index of underemployment. However, because the sample sizes are relatively small, there is huge uncertainty associated with these adjustments-which are of course magnifi ed when applied to various labor market aggregates. For example, estimates of the hourly wages of the fully employed and underemployed in wave 5 have standard errors of 1.1 and 2.1, respectively. Given that the diff erence between the means is 2.9, this hardly seems like strong statistical ground on which to argue that our index of underemployment represents a signifi cant overestimate of the true level of slack in the UK labor market.
 Th e hourly wage data used to calculate productivity adjustment relate only to employees. Th is excludes all self-employed workers who want more hours than regular employees (see table 4 ).
 It is well known that longitudinal data analysis creates downward biases due to measurement error biases. Misclassifi cation of a small number of workers will produce a much larger error in longitudinal data than in cross-section analysis and cannot be readily ignored. Richard B. Freeman (1984) points out that the reason for the greater error is twofold. "On the one hand, random misclassifi cation of workers in two periods will produce a larger number of misclassifi ed workers than random misclassifi cation in one period. On the other hand, by obtaining information on underemployment on small numbers of changers, the longitudinal analysis will contain a smaller number of correct observations. As a result the proportion of observations in error will be much larger in the longitudinal analysis than in the cross-section analysis producing a larger downward bias."
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 Th e Weale analysis considers only one form of transition: from underemployment or overemployment to full employment. He does not pick up those who were fully employed in the fi rst instance and subsequently express a desire to increase or decrease their hours. As is clear from table 8 a larger number moved from fully employed to underemployed (n = 1,305) than either stayed underemployed (n = 722) or became fully employed (n = 932).
 Th e biggest problem for the argument being put forward by Weale and the MPC is that our underemployment index indicates that there was no underemployment when the economy was running close to full employment. As fi gures 5 and 6 show, there was essentially no underemployment in the United Kingdom from 2000 through 2007 when the average unemployment rate was a mere 5.2 percent. When the recession hit, the diff erence between the number of extra hours per week that were desired increased, while the corresponding number from people who wanted fewer remained broadly fl at. It seems hard to believe the two series won't close back to prerecession equality, if and when the economy returns to full employment.
CONCLUSIONS
Our paper contests the view that the long-term unemployed, because of their supposed greater distance from work, should be treated as a diff erent category when assessing the level of slack in the UK labor market. Microeconometric evidence from the United States and our evidence from the United Kingdom, cannot distinguish any statistically signifi cant diff erence between long-term unemployment and overall unemployment in their eff ects on wages. Th ere is zero empirical justifi cation for focusing only on the shortterm unemployed when calibrating slack in the UK labor market.
We also argue that there is insuffi cient evidence to infer that our recent estimates of underemployment tend to exaggerate the extent of labor market slack. Weale argues that responses in the UK Labour Force Survey cannot be taken at face value. When asked whether individuals want to increase or decrease their weekly hours of work, Weale contends that the employed exaggerate the change in working time that they desire-upward or downward. Using data only for 2012, he states that those who wanted to increase or decrease their hours at the beginning of the year and then claimed that they were fully employed at the end of the year did not achieve the increase or reduction in hours that they wanted at the outset.
Th ere are a several empirical issues with Weale's analysis (2014). Th ese include sample selection biases and small sample sizes, which inevitably lead to relatively large standard errors and undermine the precision of adjustments to aggregate changes in desired hours. In particular, the productivity adjustments, which are crucial to his argument, are subject to signifi cant uncertainty. Th ese within-sample issues are further amplifi ed by the fall in response rates between wave 1 and wave 5 and the absence of the self-employed from the analysis.
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Th e last time interest rates were raised was in July 2007. At that time the unemployment rate was 5.5 percent while our underemployment index stood at 5.8 percent-a gap of 0.3 percent. For the period February-April 2014, the unemployment rate was 6.6 percent, while the underemployment index in 2014Q1 was 8.4 percent-a gap of 1.8 percent. In July 2007, when interest rates were last raised, the CPI was 1.9 percent and the RPI was 3.4 percent. In May 2014, the CPI was increasing at 1.5 percent and the RPI at 2.4 percent per annum. In our view there is little or no reason to believe the underemployment rate will not return to balance as the economy approaches full employment.
With little or no foundation the MPC is making two arbitrary downward adjustments to labor market slack in the United Kingdom. Th is paper has argued that these judgments are inappropriate; the UK labor market is much further from full employment than the MPC calculates and in consequence there is much less wage pressure than it is forecasting. We prefer the evidence to guessing. 
